When the Houston Rockets made the ill-advised decision to trade Chris Paul, two protected first round picks, and two protected first round pick swaps for Russell Westbrook, they leveraged control of their future in an attempt to double down on the present. This trade was obviously a disaster, but due to the sharp maneuvering of GM Rafael Stone, the organization was able to recoup a lot of draft capital by trading away James Harden, Robert Covington, Russell Westbrook, PJ Tucker, and Eric Gordon. It’s completely fair to say that Houston indeed clawed back some control over their future.
But only some of it.
Normally, a team like the Rockets has a choice three years into a rebuild like this:
Use any available cap space to intelligently accelerate the rebuild timeline.
Stand pat and reap the benefits of another year in the tank.
Option two does not exist for the Rockets. They traded it away on July 11th, 2019. The knew this when they planning out their rebuild during the summer of 2020. It’s why they’ve been judicious about not compromising cap flexibility. It shouldn’t strike anyone as a coincidence that Houston has this much money available the summer before they start surrounding first round picks to the Oklahoma City Thunder. It’s by design.
Look no further than the original James Harden trade.
Most national pundits framed part of this trade as the Rockets choosing Victor Oladipo over Caris LaVert and Jarett Allen. While it’s probably true that Houston saw an upside scenario of Oladipo holding more value than LeVert and Allen, that was only part of the reason they took this gamble. Here’s the other reason:
By redirecting Allen to the Cavaliers, the Rockets netted themselves another first rounder and prevented $20 million in salary from eating into their space this year. Allen was also good enough to keep Houston away from top lottery picks in 2022 and 2023. Whereas if Oladipo didn’t work out, his contract was expiring and the Rockets could wipe their hands of the mistake relatively cleanly (Indiana’s net gain for Caris LaVert ended up being two second round picks). They confirmed this strategy when they sent Oladipo to Miami for Kelly Olynyk’s expiring salary a few months later.
And if that didn’t convince you, Houston evaded long-term contracts in their trades of PJ Tucker, Eric Gordon, Daniel Theis, and Christian Wood in the following years. Avoiding this kind of money once could be considered a fluke for a rebuilding team. Twice could be a coincidence. By the fifth time it should’ve become pretty clear that the Rockets were deliberately keeping their options open for the summer of 2023. No team accidentally stumbles upon over $60 million in salary cap space.
Making a splash this summer (or multiple splashes) was always Houston’s plan.
If you’re someone who works in this space that recently realized how much cap space the Rockets have this summer, you just haven’t been paying attention. Houston gave themselves room to pivot to winning by the time the Thunder picks came due. All the buzz about their their numerous free agent pursuits (including Harden) isn’t stemming from “Tilman Fertitta’s impatience”, but the front office’s orchestration.
Anyone who claims the Rockets should view their outgoing picks as sunk costs is absolutely correct. But that doesn’t change the fact that the Rockets no longer have any incentive to lose games. Quite the opposite actually:
Talent evaluation becomes easier when you’re good.
Assets become more valuable when you’re good.
Other players want to play for you when you’re good.
And because of the front office’s careful maneuvering, they will have $60 million and a rebuilt war chest to aid in becoming good. Obviously Houston shouldn’t be reckless in how they spend their resources. In that regard, value deals will rule the day. However, it’s been proven time and time again that stars like James Harden are the ultimate form of value deals.
The logic in their plan just tracks. Any notion of the Rockets becoming ultra-aggressive in free agency out of desperation lacks credibility. You don’t have to do much digging to know that the organization has had July of 2023 circled for a very long time. It’s understandable that Houston is a low priority team to cover for folks in the national media, but after everything we’ve learned about free agency and the CBA this past decade, we should all be able to connect the dots.
The time to disagree with Houston’s plan was three years ago, not three months ago. For good or bad, they’ve already boxed themselves into this strategy. Now it’s time for them to actually execute their vision. We’ll see how they manage to do that.